FFTC Agricultural Policy Platform (FFTC-AP)

ABSTRACT

This report presents South Korea’s Ten Key Agricultural Policy Issues for 2026, identified against the backdrop of ongoing global economic uncertainty, a persistently high won–U.S. dollar exchange-rate environment, and accelerating rural depopulation and population aging in the agricultural sector. It underscores the need for an integrated and forward-looking policy framework that balances short-term risk management with long term structural transformation. The report highlights key policy priorities, including strengthening farm income and risk management systems, establishing a permanent support system for agricultural input costs, and developing an integrated food security framework. It also emphasizes the effective implementation of the Rural Basic Income pilot program, the exploration of its future direction, and the reinforcement of supply demand management and the establishment of a fair and transparent market order. In addition, the report addresses major structural policy agendas, including the institutional transformation of rural living conditions, the transition to eco-friendly and low carbon agriculture, a balanced policy approach to young farmer development and retirement incentives for elderly farmers, the expansion of the state’s role in food security and food safety management, and the strategic expansion of K-Food exports in line with the rising global status of the K-Brand.

Keywords: Korean agricultural policy, ten key agricultural policy issues, farm income stability, food security, rural basic income, K-food export.

INTRODUCTION

Major changes in internal and external conditions for agriculture and rural areas in 2026

In 2026, South Korea's agricultural and rural sectors are expected to face a complex combination of external shocks and internal structural challenges that will continue to reshape the production environment and the policy landscape. Global economic conditions, domestic macroeconomic vulnerabilities, climate change, and demographic decline are overlapping, while digital transformation and the global expansion of K-culture are simultaneously opening up new opportunities.

The global economy is expected to slow further amid ongoing trade tensions and contractions. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects global economic growth in 2026 at 3.1%, slightly lower than the 3.2% of 2025, and cites the expansion of protectionism, population aging and shortages of technical labor, fiscal fragility and financial market instability, climate shocks, and geopolitical tensions as key risk factors (IMF, 2025). The World Trade Organization (WTO) also expects the cooling of the global economy to intensify in 2026 as each country's tariff hikes take full effect throughout the year, forecasting merchandise trade growth at just 0.5%, considerably lower than the 2.4% projected for 2025 (WTO, 2025).

Korea's economy in 2026 is projected to grow by around 1.8%, driven mainly by a recovery in domestic demand despite slower export growth. Private consumption is expected to increase by 1.6% on the back of declining market interest rates and expansionary fiscal policy, while equipment investment (2.0%) and construction investment (2.2%) are also expected to grow. Exports are forecast to slow due to the negative impact of U.S. tariff hikes, with growth limited to around 1.3%. Consumer prices are expected to rise by around 2.0%, similar to the previous year's 2.1%, while the number of employed people is projected to increase by about 150,000, fewer than the previous year's 170,000. Particularly notable is that the won/U.S. dollar exchange rate has recently become entrenched around the 1,400 won level, establishing a high exchange rate as a "new normal." Although international crude oil and grain prices are expected to decline in 2026, the persistence of a high exchange rate is expected to increase cost burdens not only in the agricultural sector—which is highly dependent on imported raw materials such as fertilizer, feed, and crude oil—but also in the food manufacturing and food service industries. As domestic food prices rise, policy attention and social demand for price stabilization are also expected to grow.

Climate change is emerging as a particularly serious threat. The continuing rise in global average surface temperatures and sea levels driven by global warming is increasing the frequency of extreme weather events. This is causing not only direct losses such as crop yield reductions, but also broader negative effects across the entire agricultural system (FAO, 2025). Domestically, demographic decline and aging are intensifying simultaneously. Korea's total population is projected to decline by an annual average of 0.16% over the next decade; the farming population is expected to fall to 2 million; and the share of farm households aged 65 and over is projected to reach 55.8%, deepening the trend of rural decline. To respond to this crisis, the Korean government is implementing a range of policies. To strengthen state responsibility for farm income and management safety nets and for disaster relief, revenue protection, crop insurance, and disaster countermeasures are being expanded. In addition, the public-interest direct payment system, which forms the basis of the farm income safety net, is being restructured and expanded, and a Rural Basic Income pilot project has been introduced to ensure a basic standard of living for rural residents. To overcome productivity constraints arising from aging, cooperative farming expansion programs have been introduced, and public-rental farmland purchases have been expanded to help young farmers secure land stably.

Technological innovation is also opening up new opportunities. The expanded use of big data and artificial intelligence (AI), along with the spread of smart agriculture, is bringing about labor savings and productivity gains, and agriculture is being recognized anew as a high-tech industry. With the continued strong performance of agri-food exports and simultaneous growth in upstream and downstream industries—such as smart farms, agrochemicals, and veterinary pharmaceuticals, K-Food+ exports are also expected to increase further.

In this way, Korea's agricultural sector in 2026 stands at a critical juncture. External shocks such as global economic instability and climate change, together with internal demographic and structural issues, are requiring a comprehensive rethinking of agricultural policy and rural development strategies. Through a combination of adaptive responses, structural reforms, and technological innovation, Korea aims to build a more resilient and sustainable agricultural sector for the future.

PROCESS OF IDENTIFYING THE TEN KEY AGRICULTURAL POLICY ISSUES FOR 2026

The selection of the Ten Key Agricultural Policy Issues for 2026 was carried out through a multi-phase process that systematically combined literature and media analysis, expert consultations, and public perception surveys to ensure both objectivity and relevance.

The first phase focused on continuously identifying emerging agricultural and rural issues by reviewing research outputs and media sources. Every week, weekly briefs summarizing domestic and international conditions and policy trends in agriculture and rural areas were prepared. At the same time, a comprehensive review was conducted of publications in the agricultural and rural sectors (including agricultural policy-related institutions, government press releases on national tasks, etc.) and of press articles, resulting in the identification of 74 key keywords related to agricultural policy issues.

In the second phase, these keywords were consolidated into a first-round pool of 20 candidate agricultural policy issues. The importance and priority of each policy agenda were then examined in detail by gathering opinions from experts in each field, and ultimately, 17 candidate issues were selected as the final pool.

In the third phase, to select the final ten issues, surveys were conducted of farmers[1], urban residents, and academic experts. From October 28 to November 19, 2025, a survey of 1,378 farmers, 1,500 urban residents, and 81 experts was conducted. The surveys of farmers and urban residents were conducted as part of KREI's annual "2025 Public Opinion Survey on Agriculture and Rural Areas." The farmer sample was drawn through KREI's local correspondent network, while urban respondents were selected through a specialized survey agency. The expert survey was conducted online with professors and researchers in agriculture-related fields. The main content of the survey was an evaluation of the importance of the final candidate issues for the 2026 agricultural policy agenda.

Finally, based on a comprehensive assessment of the survey results, the Ten Key Agricultural Policy Issues for 2026 were confirmed. The issues that farmers on the ground regarded as most important were viewed somewhat differently by experts and urban residents. Farmers ranked immediate farm-management stabilization measures—such as price guarantees and support for essential farm inputs—as the most important issues, whereas forward-looking tasks such as smart technology and the expansion of renewable energy were rated as relatively less important. Experts placed greater weight on long-term, macro-level challenges such as generational change, climate crisis response, and food security. Urban residents gave higher priority to consumer-perspective issues such as animal welfare, price stability, and distribution efficiency.

Based on the principle that placing top priority on the problems actually experienced by farmers—the direct parties to agricultural policy—best guide the development of timely, effective, and widely accepted policy, the Ten Key Agricultural Policy Issues for 2026 were selected using farmers' importance scores. Compared to 2025, food security and price response, which had been the top two issues, moved down to the 3^rd–5^th positions, while management stabilization measures such as price guarantees and farm input support rose to the 1st and 2nd positions, reflecting the hardships experienced on the ground. In addition, medium- and long-term issues such as agricultural digitization/smart agriculture (ranked 7^th in 2025) dropped significantly (to 15^th), reflecting farmers' demand for immediate responses.

Table 1. Survey results of major agricultural policy issues for 2026

Note 1: Importance is scored on a 10-point scale.

Note 2: "Urban − Farmer" and "Expert − Farmer" indicate differences in importance scores between each group and the farmer group (positive values mean higher importance than farmers; negative values mean lower importance).

Source: Compiled by the authors.

TEN KEY AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL POLICY ISSUES FOR 2026

Issue 1: Realizing farm income stability through the refinement of the risk management system

In 2025, Korea's agricultural sector faced a combination of uncertainties—climate change-driven extreme weather, heightened volatility in international grain prices, and exchange-rate fluctuations. Individual farms' capacity to absorb and diversify such risks on their own remains limited, reaffirming that farm income stability is not merely a matter of ex-post compensation but rather a matter of ongoing, systematic risk management. Although major risk management systems such as crop insurance and revenue protection are in operation, their structural limitations have become clearly visible in a situation where risk factors expanded simultaneously in 2025. Coverage levels have not been adequately linked to actual damage, and the scope of application has not sufficiently reflected field-level demand, so the income-stabilization effect experienced by farmers has remained limited.

In 2026, the rationalization of the premium discount/surcharge system of crop insurance will be pursued in earnest to enhance its effectiveness. Bonus-malus criteria need to be more precisely designed to both boost enrollment incentives and encourage farmers' voluntary risk management (e.g., preventive measures and disaster response). In addition, as market price volatility increases alongside climate risk, there will be stronger policy demands to expand the crops covered by revenue protection and to improve the system to cover risks of price declines and income losses, thereby strengthening the overall risk management system.

Closing coverage gaps for certain commodities, small farms, and mixed-operation farms that have previously been excluded from the system or received limited benefits will also emerge as a key task. To ensure that agricultural disaster countermeasures function as a complement to crop insurance, it will be necessary in the short term to raise disaster recovery support to realistic levels and to refine in advance the eligibility, support criteria, and operating framework of the Non-insured-crop Disaster Assistance Program (NAP) scheduled for introduction in 2027. Moreover, in response to the spread of pests and diseases caused by climate change, insurance products covering natural-disaster-type pests and diseases should be expanded step by step, and the nationwide rollout of the "Agricultural Weather Disaster Early Warning System" should be carried out promptly to provide preventive information.

Issue 2: Building a consecutive support system for farm operating costs, moving beyond crisis-response support

Since 2022, the prices of essential farm inputs such as fertilizer, feed, agrochemicals, and tax-free fuel have remained high due to international raw material price increases and supply chain instability, increasing the operational cost burden on farms. Because existing government support has mainly taken the form of "crisis-response" assistance provided temporarily in response to specific disasters or sharp price fluctuations, it has been limited in its ability to continuously ease the structurally higher operating cost burden. As recognition has spread that short-term subsidies cannot ensure predictable farm management, a consensus has emerged within the sector on the need for a paradigm shift toward a "permanent agricultural operating-cost support system" aimed at maintaining the agricultural production base and establishing a sustainable agricultural structure.

In 2026, institutionalizing essential farm-input support and operating it on an ongoing basis—moving beyond crisis-response support—is expected to become a core policy task. In particular, the "Act on Support for Essential Farm Inputs and Other Measures for Responding to Supply Chain Risks" (Essential Farm Input Support Act), which passed the National Assembly in November 2025, is scheduled to take full effect from December 2026. Developing concrete support measures in line with the Act will therefore be a major agenda item. Key points of contention will include which farm inputs are designated as "essential" and the level of support they will receive. During the drafting of the enforcement decree, it will be necessary to adjust interest rates across farm sizes and commodities, including whether to include not only fertilizer and feed but also agrochemicals and organic farm inputs, how to reflect international price movements in support unit prices, and whether to cap total support.

This represents a shift from reliance on one-off supplementary budgets to legislating a phased response framework that can implement preemptive price-stabilization measures in the event of supply chain risks. In parallel, the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs of South Korea government is pursuing the construction of an information system that tracks and forecasts prices of raw materials and products related to essential farm inputs, and is also proceeding with the diversification of imports and stockpiling of essential farm inputs in order to reduce exposure to international price fluctuations. During the compilation of the 2026 government budget, farmers' organizations actively called for increased budgets for existing programs—such as support for direct feed transactions and subsidies for inorganic fertilizer prices—which together with a permanent support system aim to structurally ease the operating-cost burden on farms.

Issue 3: Strengthening the food security framework through strategic responses to supply chain volatility

In 2025, volatility in international grain supply, demand, and prices expanded owing to geopolitical conflicts, logistical uncertainties, and the accumulation of extreme weather events. Domestically, supply-demand imbalances have accumulated, particularly in rice, and market interventions for price stabilization have been implemented in parallel, increasing the difficulty of supply-and-demand management. This has reaffirmed that a temporary remedy cannot cope with expanded volatility and that a systematic food security framework—covering transformation of the domestic production base, advanced stockpile operation, and overseas procurement risk management—is needed.

In 2026, discussions on laws and plans supporting food security institutionally will continue, and beyond the enactment of legislation itself, the core issues will include what to measure and manage (indicators and targets), what instruments to use (stockpiles/procurement/production), and how far to bear the costs of market intervention and fiscal burdens (principles and governance). Moving beyond a focus on self-sufficiency ratios, an integrated supply chain management framework that organically links the expansion of domestic grain production, stable import procurement, and stockpile operations is coming to the fore. The proposal of a food self-sufficiency target of around 55.5% and the accompanying discussion on adjusting the target timeline can be understood as an extension of this integrated "target management" debate. In particular, since stockpile operations cannot guarantee effectiveness by expanding volume alone, the operating system—including peacetime rotation, quality management, storage infrastructure, and release criteria—must be refined in concert.

The effectiveness of the strategic crop direct payment system—which adjusts the rice cultivation area and expands the cultivation of strategic crops such as wheat, soybeans, and forage—will also be a key issue. The 2026 budget is set to increase to KRW 419.6 billion (USD 289 million, at the December 2025 exchange rate) [from KRW 244.0 billion (USD 168 million) in 2025], with the supported area increasing from 176,000 hectares to 205,000 hectares. Rice for supply/demand adjustment (KRW 5 million - USD 3,400 as of December 2025- per hectare) will be introduced, and the coverage and unit prices for items such as sorghum, Job's tears, alfalfa, and buckwheat will be expanded. However, effectiveness can only be secured if acreage expansion is accompanied by linkage with sales channels and demand destinations (processing, feed, public demand, etc.), expansion of contract-based transactions, and division of roles between public stockpiles and private inventories.

To reduce dependence on specific countries or trade routes, strategies for diversifying supply chains will also be strengthened. There will be a growing need to expand discussions that concretely package diversification of import sources, long-term contracts and logistics hubs, and emergency import systems, in the form of overseas grain distribution networks and greater utilization of Korean companies' overseas distribution networks.

Issue 4: Settling in the rural basic income pilot project and exploring future directions

In September 2025, the "Bill on Support for Rural Basic Income" was referred to the National Assembly's Agriculture, Forestry, Livestock, Food and Marine Affairs Committee, and the institutional foundation for the Rural Basic Income pilot project was laid. The government conducted an open application process targeting 69 “gun[2]” regions facing intensified extinction risks due to population decline and aging. On October 23, seven cities or regions—Yeoncheon-gun in Gyeonggi, Jeongseon-gun in Gangwon, Cheongyang-gun in Chungnam, Sunchang-gun in Jeonbuk, Sinan-gun in Jeonnam, Yeongyang-gun in Gyeongbuk, and Namhae-gun in Gyeongnam—were selected as the first pilot regions. Following an increase in the National Assembly budget, three more regions—Okcheon-gun in Chungbuk, Jangsu-gun in Jeonbuk, and Gokseong-gun in Jeonnam—were added, bringing the total to 10 regions. Residents of the selected areas are scheduled to receive approximately USD $100 per month in local gift certificates (in local currency) for two years, starting in January 2026.

Notably, immediately after selection, population increases were observed in the seven initially selected regions. According to the Ministry of the Interior and Safety's resident registration statistics for September–November 2025, Sinan-gun, Jeonnam rose from 38,883 to 41,545; Jeongseon-gun, Gangwon from 33,266 to 34,457; and Yeoncheon-gun, Gyeonggi from 41,027 to 41,978, among others. This suggests the possibility of short-term population movement driven by policy expectations, and highlights the need to examine, in future performance evaluations, both the persistence and the qualitative nature of these increases. 2026, the first year of implementation, will be a crucial test year in which the policy effects of Rural Basic Income must be demonstrated through refined performance indicators that go beyond simple population inflow—covering, for example, the economic effects of local-currency use, increases in local consumption, and changes in participation in community activities.

The sustainability of the project, however, will depend on financing, conflict management, and the establishment of a performance evaluation system. The government proposed a cost-sharing structure of 40% central funds and 60% local funds, but during the National Assembly's budget review at the end of 2025, a proviso was added stipulating that "provincial-level wide-area governments must bear 30% of the total project cost for central funding to be allocated." As a result, project implementation has been delayed or halted in some regions. Gun area with low fiscal self-reliance may have to adjust their budgets against existing programs to cover their share of local funding, giving rise to concerns about deteriorating local finances and intra-regional conflicts arising from cuts to existing programs. Going forward, further review is needed as to whether the county-level payment approach adequately reflects actual living zones and local economic structures, whether local-currency payment is the optimal means of maximizing policy effects, and whether the current financing structure is sustainable in the medium to long term.

Issue 5: Strengthening supply-and-demand adjustment at each production-distribution stage and establishing a fair market order

In the agri-food field in 2025, repeated supply disruptions caused by climate change brought household grocery price instability to the fore as a major issue. The government continuously operated bodies such as a public-private supply-demand adjustment committee, a growth management council, and an emergency supply-demand stabilization task force, while pursuing price stabilization for some commodities through emergency measures such as tariff-rate quotas. However, the limits of such short-term measures were pointed out, and the need for preemptive, structural responses—such as reinforcing climate adaptation and supply-stabilization mechanisms—has expanded. At the same time, the inefficiency of the agricultural product distribution structure has been identified as a factor in price increases, and discussions on reforming distribution-stage structures have begun in earnest.

To spread online distribution, an online wholesale market for agricultural and fishery products has been established, and platform user fees have been waived for the initial settlement period (free for the first three years, 0.3% thereafter), aiming to reduce farms' distribution cost burden and help stabilize consumer prices. Issues raised during parliamentary audits—such as excessive profits of wholesale market corporations and reduced farm receipt prices due to complex distribution stages—have underscored the need to ease distribution monopoly structures, enhance transparency, and guide reasonable margins.

In 2026, as climate anomalies and external factors overlap to cause fluctuations in harvests and instability in raw material prices, the risks of higher agricultural production costs and persistent price pressure will grow. Accordingly, a preemptive and strategic supply-and-demand management system that responds to the "climate-flation"[3] phase must be further upgraded. Supply/demand plans should be formulated and implemented annually, while the management framework should be refined to reflect the planting–growing–shipping stages, and governance should be restructured so that decision-making by central production-area councils and the implementation/support functions of (regional) supply/demand management centers operate in an integrated manner. Weather early warning and growth monitoring should be upgraded, and supply-shock response measures, such as stockpiling key commodities and flexible market interventions, should be made permanent.

The task of improving the distribution structure should focus on making the on-the-ground outcomes of the 2025 measures visible in 2026. Oversight should be strengthened so that reforms of public wholesale markets and reductions in distribution stages lead to improvements in trading practices and fee structures, and so that wholesale market corporations are guided toward transparent management and reasonable margins, thereby narrowing the gap between farm receipt prices and prices perceived by consumers. In particular, 2025 saw the establishment of a legal basis for operating the online wholesale market for agricultural and fishery products, including legislation establishing a dedicated corporation and its integration into the formal regulatory framework. In preparation for the spread of digital distribution, linkage infrastructure across producer areas, wholesale, and retail, as well as settlement and data-linkage systems, should be developed. Producer organizations and the storage/logistics capacity of Agricultural Product Processing Centers (APCs) should be strengthened to expand contract-based transactions, thereby enhancing the efficiency and fairness of the production and distribution stages.

Issue 6: Institutional transformation to improve rural living conditions and innovate essential social services

As of 2024, the number of abandoned vacant houses in rural areas was estimated at approximately 78,000. Although local governments have taken the lead in maintenance efforts, most responses have focused on demolition, with relatively few cases of active reuse. Moreover, as the legal bases governing vacant houses are dispersed across multiple statutes, there have been limitations in establishing a systematic approach to surveying actual conditions, prioritizing maintenance, and linking financial support. To address these structural constraints, the Special Act on the Maintenance and Management of Rural and Fishing Village Vacant Houses has been introduced. Efforts are currently underway to establish a centralized management system at the national level, led by the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs (MAFRA) and the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries (MOF).

If the Special Act enables a mandatory nationwide survey of vacant houses, the formulation of five-year maintenance plans, and the provision of national fiscal support along with special regulatory provisions, rural vacant-house management is expected to shift from fragmented local initiatives to a more institutionalized and systematic framework. Going forward, policy outcomes should be evaluated and expanded not only in terms of demolition and remodeling performance, but also in relation to improvements in rural living conditions—such as enhanced residential stability, improved access to essential services, and the creation of community spaces.

In addition, in 2025, the Rural Service Agreement (RSA) program was introduced, and a pilot initiative is being implemented to develop a resident-led service delivery model. Under this program, residents and local governments jointly plan and provide essential services—such as care, meals, and education—with coordinated support from both central and local governments. Based on the pilot results, this resident-led model should be expanded to other regions, while strengthening linkages with existing policy initiatives such as Life-SOC (a Korean policy program aimed at expanding essential living infrastructure).

In line with the Fifth Master Plan for Rural Health and Welfare (2025–2029), investment in healthcare, welfare, and care services should be expanded, alongside the introduction of innovative solutions such as digital telemedicine and smart care. The RSA framework can serve as a critical opportunity to transition rural welfare and care systems from a government-led supply model to a community-based operational model. In the medium- to long-term, this shift may drive structural transformation in rural service delivery systems.

Meanwhile, under the Rural Spatial Restructuring and Regeneration Act, local governments at the city and county levels can establish rural spatial master plans and designate function-specific rural districts (e.g., residential, industrial, and landscape zones). This provides an institutional foundation for the planned and systematic management and utilization of rural space, including projects involving farmland conversion—such as agrivoltaics and so-called “solar income villages” (community-based solar revenue-sharing projects).

Starting in 2026, based on these master plans, the designation of specialized rural districts, infrastructure expansion, and industrial clustering initiatives are expected to be implemented in earnest. The key policy challenge is to ensure that these districts function not as isolated development projects, but as integrated policy instruments that spatially combine vacant-house management, service provision, and local industry development, thereby contributing to tangible outcomes in addressing rural population decline.

Issue 7: Structural transition to eco-friendly, low-carbon agriculture and expansion of the foundation for implementation

As social demand for climate change response and sustainable agriculture has increased, the focus of agricultural policy is shifting from a production-centered approach toward one that transforms non-production functions—such as environmental conservation and renewable energy—into sources of farm income. In this context, the Public Interest Direct Payment Program has become a core policy instrument, stabilizing farm income by compensating for agriculture’s environmental and public-good functions, while also serving as an institutional mechanism to promote eco-friendly farming practices.

However, the current system primarily operates on a compliance-based structure, and its direct linkage to measurable environmental outcomes remains limited. Meanwhile, the Agricultural Environment Conservation Program—a key policy tool for promoting environmentally friendly practices at the local level—has faced several structural challenges, including its project-based operational model, weak integration with the public interest direct payment system, limitations in the quantitative monitoring of environmental outcomes, and constraints on expanding farmer participation. These limitations have hindered institutional stability as well as the accumulation and diffusion of policy effects. In addition, the area of certified eco-friendly farmland has remained stagnant or has declined due to rising production costs and unstable market demand. Eco-friendly farming, largely driven by individual farms, has therefore encountered structural limitations. In this context, renewable energy in the agricultural sector is gaining attention as a potential means of converting agriculture’s environmental and energy-related contributions into new sources of income.

The policy framework supporting the transition to eco-friendly, low-carbon agriculture is expected to become more concrete around 2026. The Public Interest Direct Payment Program is being reformed to strengthen optional (incentive-based) payments, including expanding coverage of eco-friendly agriculture direct payments and legal amendments introducing new optional payments related to carbon neutrality and animal welfare in livestock farming. At the same time, the Agricultural Environment Conservation Program is expected to evolve toward closer integration with the direct payment system, allowing environmental practices to be incorporated into a more systematic incentive structure. In particular, increases in payment rates for eco-friendly agriculture are likely to be a key driver of the expansion of certified farmland.

In the renewable energy sector, the introduction of agrivoltaics (agri-solar systems) is planned for the first half of 2026, enabling the parallel use of land for agricultural production and energy generation within an institutional framework. Policy efforts will focus on enhancing on-the-ground implementation by ensuring the participation and protection of tenant farmers, establishing monitoring systems for farming activities, and easing farmland-use regulations within designated renewable energy zones. In addition, renewable energy production utilizing livestock manure and agricultural byproducts is expected to expand through the development of energy conversion facilities. Finally, ensuring the sustainability of eco-friendly agriculture requires establishing stable markets and public demand. Beginning in 2026, the nationwide implementation of the Eco-Friendly Agricultural Products Support Program for Pregnant Women will be expanded, while increased public procurement—through linkages with school meal programs and other public food service systems—is expected to provide a stable market foundation for the transition to eco-friendly, low-carbon agriculture.

Issue 8: Upgrading support for young farmer development and retirement support for elderly farmers

To address the imbalance in the agricultural workforce—currently dominated by elderly farmers—and to sustain the production base of Korean agriculture, policies to foster young farmers and accelerate generational renewal are being strengthened. The Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs (MAFRA) is implementing the First Master Plan for the Development of Successor and Young Farmers (2023–2027), with the goal of nurturing 30,000 young farmers by 2027 and supporting their entry into agriculture.

While programs such as the Young Farmer Settlement Support Program have helped establish the foundation of agricultural workforce policy and increased the number of young farmers, several challenges have emerged. Initial income support remains insufficient to cover living costs, and a significant proportion of beneficiaries  have difficulty repaying policy loans. As a result, there is a growing need to shift policy focus from quantitative expansion toward qualitative improvement. Young farmers typically have limited collateral capacity, which restricts their access to financing for farmland and facilities, while appropriate financial advisory support at the start-up stage remains insufficient. In addition, although young farmers are prioritized in the allocation of government-supplied farmland, they continue to face persistent difficulties securing land due to high land prices, supply-and-demand mismatches, and limited access to relevant information. Competition for farmland is also intensifying as the number of beneficiaries increases.

The retirement of elderly farmers could potentially expand farmland supply and improve access for younger entrants. However, retirement decisions are often delayed due to non-economic factors—such as attachment to farming as a lifelong occupation and lifestyle considerations—as well as the need to secure stable retirement income. This underscores the growing importance of strengthening policy measures that incentivize retirement among elderly farmers. To support young-farmer development, structured preparatory pathways should be expanded to enable prospective entrants to receive training at certified agricultural corporations, leading farms, and educational institutions. In addition, living support should be strengthened to enable young farmers to focus on acquiring skills, business planning, and establishing their farming operations. Agricultural finance systems should also be reformed from a collateral-based approach toward one that evaluates business viability and farming capability. Furthermore, comprehensive support systems should be developed to facilitate successful entry and settlement, including stronger linkages with administrative institutions and existing agricultural entities.

MAFRA has introduced farmland pension schemes, including management-transfer-type and retirement direct-payment-type programs; however, participation rates remain low, limiting their effectiveness in facilitating farm succession. The farmland-transfer retirement direct payment scheme is also in place, but the transfer of farmland ownership has been delayed due to factors such as emotional attachment and inheritance considerations.

Looking ahead, strengthening retirement income support for elderly farmers and enhancing tangible incentives for farm succession are likely to become key policy priorities. The government is also pursuing the introduction of a Prospective Farmer System, which would recognize individuals who have completed agricultural training as eligible beneficiaries of start-up support and related policies. In addition, a farmer retirement savings pension scheme is under consideration, under which farmers would contribute over time and receive pension benefits upon retirement. As both initiatives are expected to require substantial fiscal resources, securing stable financing will be a critical prerequisite for their implementation.

Issue 9: Expanding the state's role in strengthening food security and safety management

In 2025, state-level support to strengthen food security for vulnerable groups was significantly expanded. The Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs (MAFRA) scaled up the Agri-Food Voucher Program—which enables low-income households to purchase fresh agricultural products—to nationwide coverage. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) launched, beginning December 1, a pilot Basic Food Security Corner program (also referred to as a “no-questions-asked food support model”), utilizing existing food banks and food markets.

At 56 locations nationwide, vulnerable individuals can access these facilities without a separate eligibility screening and receive 3–5 free items per visit—such as instant noodles, ready-to-eat rice, and basic daily necessities. The number of participating outlets was further expanded to approximately 70 by December. On the food safety management side, the government has significantly strengthened its regulatory framework under the banner of a State Responsibility System for Food Safety. In its 2025 policy agenda, the Ministry of Food and Drug Safety (MFDS) identified advancing this system as a central objective, aiming to promote a more reliable food safety management framework and expand support for nutritionally vulnerable groups. Alongside these efforts, the integration of digital technologies and alignment with international standards have been emphasized in food safety governance.

In 2026, these food support programs and safety management systems are expected to enter a full implementation phase, giving rise to new policy challenges. As the Basic Food Security Corner program is expanded nationwide, securing stable supply chains and sustained fiscal support will become critical. In addition, with the expansion of the Agri-Food Voucher Program, adjustments to budget scale and benefit levels will be necessary. If food price inflation persists, the real value of voucher support may decline, prompting discussions about supplementary measures, such as index-linked benefits or expanding eligible items. Furthermore, to minimize overlaps and blind spots among programs with similar objectives—such as vouchers, food banks, and the Basic Food Security Corner—integrated operational strategies should be developed.

In the field of food safety management, the adoption of advanced technologies and a shift toward proactive risk management are expected to accelerate. In particular, amendments to the Enforcement Decree of the Framework Act on Food Safety have established a legal basis for the Ministry of Food and Drug Safety to designate and operate a specialized risk forecasting institution—the Food Hazard Prediction Center. This is expected to facilitate the advancement of data-driven, preventive food safety management systems. In addition, changes in GMO labeling regulations represent a significant institutional shift. Previously, GMO labeling was required only when genetically modified DNA or protein remained in the final food product. However, under the revised Act on Labeling and Advertising of Foods (amended in December 2025), a Full GMO Labeling System is scheduled for introduction. Legal provisions for “Non-GMO” labeling have also been explicitly established for the first time, while the tolerance threshold for unintended admixture—serving as an exception to labeling requirements—is to be determined by Presidential Decree or by notification of the Ministry of Food and Drug Safety. With implementation expected around 2026, debates between consumer groups and industry stakeholders are intensifying over key issues, including the scope of applicable products, labeling methods (e.g., QR codes), and permissible levels of unintended admixture.

Issue 10: Expanding K-food exports in conjunction with the enhanced global status of the K-brand

Since the first free trade agreement (FTA) came into effect in 2004, Korea’s agri-food trade has grown nearly fourfold over two decades, from USD 13.3 billion in 2004 to USD 52.7 billion in 2024. Agri-food exports have expanded at an average annual rate of 7.6%, increasing from USD 2.1 billion to USD 9.8 billion over the same period. This growth has contributed to Korea’s overall export expansion and has drawn attention to the agri-food sector as a key growth engine.

However, as imports have grown significantly faster than exports, the agri-food trade deficit has widened substantially—from USD 5.1 billion in 2004 to USD 33.0 billion in 2024. In addition, agri-food exports remain heavily concentrated in processed foods rather than fresh agricultural products, limiting their direct contribution to farm income growth. Export markets are also highly concentrated in three countries—the United States, China, and Japan—resulting in a high level of market dependency. Against this backdrop, it is necessary to advance the industrialization of K-Food+ exports by simultaneously increasing farm income through exports and diversifying export markets.

To strengthen the linkage between export performance and domestic farm income, diversification of export markets and product portfolios—particularly for fresh agricultural products—should be actively pursued. In particular, the foundation for systematically nurturing export-oriented farms should be reinforced by supporting capacity-building from the preparatory stage, including the designation of export-oriented integrated organizations. For firms that face constraints in pursuing export activities due to limited human and financial resources, policy support should be enhanced to improve price and quality competitiveness and reduce burdens associated with non-tariff barriers and certification costs. In addition, support should be strengthened by developing an integrated export information platform that provides country-specific information on customs procedures, quarantine requirements, labeling standards, and certification systems. Expanding mutual recognition agreements with key trading partners will also be important for easing non-tariff barriers.

Strategies for agri-food exports should be differentiated by market characteristics. In core markets, policies should focus on strengthening the existing export base, while in emerging markets, emphasis should be placed on infrastructure development to lower entry barriers. In mature markets, strategies should shift toward qualitative growth rather than quantitative expansion, while low-growth markets should be managed as medium- to long-term strategic markets. Linking agri-food initiatives with Official Development Assistance (ODA) can contribute to economic development in partner countries—aligning with the fundamental objectives of ODA—while also creating opportunities for Korean firms to enter new markets and establish an export base. The government plans to adopt a more strategic approach to agricultural ODA by categorizing programs into four types: raw material production, market testing, agricultural input exports, and participation in international procurement markets. By 2030, it aims to develop 10 “national-interest-oriented export ODA models.”

The global spread of K-culture and the heightened international visibility of the K-Brand have further strengthened the growth potential of K-Food exports. Recently, agri-food exports to emerging regions—including ASEAN, Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America—have expanded, improving prospects for market diversification. By leveraging this favorable external environment, efforts should be made to achieve breakthrough growth in export performance. To this end, the rising global interest in Korean culture should be leveraged not only as a demand-side opportunity but also as a catalyst to strengthen competitiveness across the entire value chain—from production and processing to distribution and marketing—thereby accelerating the industrialization of K-Food exports.

CONCLUSION

In 2026, Korea’s agricultural sector stands at a critical juncture, confronting overlapping challenges stemming from the ongoing climate crisis, global economic uncertainty, a persistently high exchange-rate environment, and rapid rural demographic decline. In response, the government must implement an integrated and forward-looking policy framework that balances short-term risk management with long-term structural transformation. Key policy priorities include strengthening farm income and management safety nets, establishing a permanent support system for agricultural input costs, and developing an integrated food security framework. In addition, efforts should focus on the effective implementation of the Rural Basic Income pilot program, exploring its future direction, and strengthening supply–demand management to ensure a fair and transparent market order. At the same time, structural transition efforts must advance across multiple domains, including the transition to eco-friendly, low-carbon agriculture; a balanced policy approach to young farmer development and retirement incentives for elderly farmers; the expansion of the state’s role in food security and food safety management; and the strategic expansion of K-Food exports in line with the rising global status of the K-Brand. Through these comprehensive and coordinated policy efforts, Korea can build a more sustainable, competitive, and resilient agricultural sector for the future.

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