ABSTRACT
The “Reiwa Rice Riots” in Japan exhibit three key characteristics: rice shortages, soaring prices, and historical significance. Triggered by sudden shifts in supply and demand for rice produced in 2023, shortages and fierce competition for rice emerged, causing prices to skyrocket. This event is not merely a temporary trend and is expected to mark a historic turning point in Japan’s rice distribution policy. Furthermore, domestic mass media coverage has become heated, focusing primarily on current and projected supermarket rice prices; however, this reporting often exhibits a narrow perspective or prioritizes sensationalism. Consequently, confusion surrounding the “Reiwa Rice Riots” has been amplified by mass media reporting. To elevate national discourse on Japanese rice and agriculture, the content of mass media coverage—which frequently focuses solely on localized topics—needs to be revised.
Keywords: Reiwa Rice Riots, rice riots, rice shortages, soaring prices, mass media
Three Characteristics of the “Reiwa Rice Riots”
Japanese mass media use the phrase “Reiwa Rice Riots” in the summer of 2024 to capture attention during a rice shortage—Reiwa is the Japanese era name (Reiwa era: May 2019–present). Moreover, due to factors like the sharp rise in rice prices and the release of reserve rice stocks, by August 2025, the mass media sometimes referred to the specific rice shortage of summer 2024 as the “Reiwa Rice Riots,” also applying the term to the broader price surge and associated developments spanning 2024 to 2025.
The term “Reiwa Rice Riots” currently encompasses at least three distinct realities: rice shortages, price surges, and historical significance. This paper analyzes the “Reiwa Rice Riots” by dividing these realities into three categories. Additionally, the author, a scholar who experienced and witnessed media interactions firsthand, shares some of those experiences to supplement the analysis and explore another facet of the “Reiwa Rice Riots.”
The “Reiwa Rice Riots” as a rice shortage
In August 2024, the phrase “Reiwa Rice Riots” experienced a sharp increase in search volume on Google and other platforms (Ogawa 2024). At the time, the mass media reported images of rice disappearing from supermarket shelves in some cities, while some media outlets used the phrase “Reiwa Rice Riots,” which gained widespread use over time.
A notable feature of this incident was insufficient data on actual scarcity. The only exception was Osaka Governor Hirofumi Yoshimura’s investigation into shortages within Osaka Prefecture, which he cited on August 26 as justification for requesting the release of government rice reserves. The specific distribution of the rice shortages remained unclear; however, as information spread through news reports and social media, the situation quickly spread to other cities and rural areas, leading to nationwide rice shortages.
A combination of supply and demand issues was the main factor behind the rice shortages in the summer of 2024.
On the supply side, the intense heatwave of 2023 caused high-temperature damage to rice crops, resulting in a nationwide decline in rice quality. Rice varieties with relatively low heat tolerance (including Koshihikari, which holds the top share in both domestic production and consumption) suffered significant quality deterioration. The ratio of Grade 1 rice for Niigata Prefecture’s Koshihikari fell to 4.9% (compared to the average of 75.3%). The 2023 rice crop was also characterized by a significant decrease in the amount of rice falling through the sieve during sorting (known as sieve-bottom rice), falling from 510,000 tons to 320,000 tons.
On the demand side, consumption exceeded the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries’ projections, driven primarily by soaring prices. Beyond the general upward trend in prices, the Ukraine crisis increased prices for bread and noodles, which use wheat as a raw material. Conversely, rice prices were stable among foodstuffs. For citizens struggling with inflation, rice seemed relatively affordable, making it easier for demand to grow. Furthermore, after May 8, 2023, COVID-19 was reclassified as a Category 5 infectious disease under Japan’s Infectious Diseases Control Law. Following this, the restaurant industry began to recover, and the momentum for recovery and an increase in foreign tourists gained momentum. This situation led to a significant surge in rice demand, encompassing both restaurant consumption and inbound tourism.
Furthermore, during the transitional period in August 2024, a special advisory was issued for the Nankai Trough earthquake, while the erratic path of a large typhoon (Typhoon No. 10) heightened food stockpiling awareness across much of the country.
Additionally, high-temperature damage to rice crops and increased damage from stink bugs, whose annual occurrence frequency rose due to higher temperatures, reduced the proportion of rice suitable for commercial distribution.
Industry stakeholders anticipated the 2023 rice harvest scarcity, with competition for rice already expected to begin by autumn of that year; thus, the “Reiwa Rice Riots” were not merely a shortage caused by insufficient supply, but a phenomenon driven by fierce competition for rice.
The “Reiwa Rice Riots” as a price surge
Rice prices began rising in June 2024 before surging sharply due to “multiple factors.” For example, beyond price increases due to the scarcity of the 2023 rice crop, competition for the 2024 crop intensified. Wholesalers, restaurants, and catering services competed for supplies, leading to diversified procurement channels. Moreover, consumers purchased rice directly from farmers or secured it through hometown tax donations, further fueling the scramble for the commodity. The increased procurement costs were passed on to consumers through higher retail prices, leaving no choice but to accept the increases.
The price increases from the 2023 rice crop through the 2025 crop occurred in five distinct periods or stages.
The first stage occurred from March to June 2024. Prices did not rise significantly from autumn 2023 through February 2024, while the scramble for rice began. However, starting in March 2024, rice traders began to feel that supply and demand would tighten. At this time, the transaction price between shippers and wholesalers rose 2.8% from JPY15,428 (US$102[1]) per 60kg (March) to JPY15,865 (US$105) (June), reaching its highest level in about 11 years.
The second surge occurred from July to August 2024. On July 30, 2024, the government announced that rice demand from July 2023 to June 2024 had grown significantly more than forecasted. Furthermore, heightened vigilance against earthquakes and typhoons in August increased household stockpiling. The transaction price between shippers and wholesalers reached JPY16,133 (US$107) per 60kg in August 2024, the highest August price recorded since statistics began in 2008.
According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications’ “Retail Price Statistics,” the retail price per 5kg of Koshihikari rice in Tokyo’s 23 wards had remained below JPY2,500 (US$17) since 2011; however, it rose to JPY2,561 (US$17) in June 2024 (a 12.2% year-over-year increase) and further to JPY2,871 (US$19) in August 2024 (a 23.1% year-over-year increase). The price increase during this period is believed to have been driven by panic buying, resulting from the absence of established routine stockpiling behavior. Furthermore, the timing of this behavior, which occurred during the transitional period before new rice became widely available, significantly exacerbated the rice shortage.
The third wave occurred from September 2024 to October 2024. Even after new rice became widely available, prices did not decline due to intensified competition for rice and lower-than-expected rice quality. Increased demand for the 2023 crop led to “early consumption of new rice” for the 2024 crop, which sustained tight supply and demand conditions.
The fourth wave occurred from November 2024 to February 2025. Following the rice shortage in summer 2024, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) announced its detailed analysis results at the end of October. However, rather than presenting detailed findings, the summary essentially stated that the dissemination of appropriate information was a key issue and that MAFF would strengthen its efforts to release information.
This statement reaffirmed MAFF’s stance of merely issuing information without taking direct action, even when the private sector faced turmoil. This situation led to heightened crisis awareness among businesses and a surge in transaction prices between them.
Notably, during this season, buyers began offering prices significantly higher than the provisional payments that agricultural cooperatives (JAs) typically present to rice farmers during collection. Consequently, major collectors, such as JA groups, failed to secure sufficient rice, resulting in a 230,000-ton decrease in collection volume and a 480,000-ton drop in inventory by the end of January 2025 compared to the same period the previous year. Meanwhile, major wholesalers successfully maintained inventory levels comparable to those of previous years. The risk of purchasing at high prices was mitigated by passing on the costs to the consumer. Backed by purchasing support from actual consumers, major rice wholesalers achieved record profits and rising stock prices.
The government’s decision to release reserve rice in February 2025 temporarily suppressed rice prices. However, the 2023 crop was already trading at high prices during collection and distribution. Even with the release of reserve rice, prices for the 2023 crop did not decline significantly.
The fifth wave is the price of the 2025 crop, as the scramble for rice continues, and prices remain unsettled. JAs in regions where the collection rate for the 2024 crop declined are attempting to compensate by increasing the estimated payments offered to rice farmers for the 2025 crop. Some JAs have even introduced a new approach: presenting an estimated payment as a minimum guaranteed amount before sowing, regardless of price fluctuations.
The author anticipates that the same situation of intense competition for rice among diverse entities, observed with the 2024 crop, will recur in 2025.
The “Reiwa Rice Riots” as a historical event
Japan’s rice production has faced ongoing adjustments amid long-term declining demand, resulting in a persistent downward trend in prices (Ogawa 2025b). Against this backdrop, the “Reiwa Rice Riots,” characterized by rice shortages and price surges, represent an unprecedented shift in the balance of supply and demand.
Can the “Reiwa Rice Riots” be evaluated as a historical event on par with the historically recognized “Taisho Rice Riots” and “Heisei Rice Riots”?
Regarding this point, Ogawa (2024b) noted that the evaluation criterion should be whether there was a significant policy change that affected the fundamental principle of the current policy, which is that the private sector primarily leads rice distribution. Both the “Taisho Rice Riots” and the “Heisei Rice Riots” served as catalysts for shifts concerning state intervention in rice distribution. Taisho is a Japanese era name (Taisho era: July 1912 to December 1926). Heisei is a Japanese era name (Heisei era: January 1989 to April 2019). The “Taisho Rice Riots” catalyzed the shift from an era of essentially free rice trading to one of state intervention. Similarly, the “Heisei Rice Riots” became a catalyst for advancing: ① the opening of the rice market, ② private-sector-led rice distribution, and ③ the legalization of government rice stockpiles.
Based on this criterion, merely observing the actual conditions of shortages and price surges cannot position the “Reiwa Rice Riots” as a historically significant event.
From a historical perspective, the key point of the “Reiwa Rice Riots” is the policy change implemented in January 2025, which enabled the release of government-held rice reserves to facilitate smoother distribution. This change led to the release of large quantities of government-held rice reserves by August 2025, resulting in significant state intervention and influence on rice distribution and supply–demand dynamics. Based on the criteria outlined by Ogawa (2024b), it can be argued that the situation qualifying as the “Reiwa Rice Riots” was established with the 2025 policy change.
From the perspective of rice distribution, the key points of the 2025 policy change are as follows.
First, on January 31, under Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Taku Eto, the operational policy for government-held reserve rice was revised. The revised policy now allows the release of reserve rice “when obstacles arise in the smooth distribution of rice for primary consumption, and the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries deems it necessary, within the scope that does not hinder the smooth operation of the reserves.” To implement this policy change without amending the Food Law, the release was structured as a “sale with repurchase conditions,” functioning as a loan of government reserve rice. While the national policy maintains that private sector distribution is fundamental, this change created a mechanism allowing direct government intervention in rice distribution based on the Minister’s judgment. Actual auctions commenced in February.
The policy change that accelerated state intervention in distribution was the abolition of the “sale with repurchase conditions” mechanism itself, carried out under the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, Shinjiro Koizumi. This policy change was implemented without consulting the Food, Agriculture, and Rural Policy Council, as stipulated by Article 4 of the Food Act, and was subsequently abolished by Minister Koizumi’s unilateral decision (Ogawa 2025a). Previously, releasing government-held rice stocks required Cabinet approval during emergencies and deliberation by the Food, Agriculture, and Rural Policy Council during shortages. However, in 2025, Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Eto enabled the release of government-held rice stockpiles through “sale with repurchase conditions.” Minister Koizumi’s abolition of this “sale with repurchase conditions” created a new loophole in policy tools, allowing the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries to release any amount of government-held rice stockpiles at their discretion.
While attention tended to focus on the method (discretionary contracts), sales destinations, and sales volume of Minister Koizumi’s releases of government-held rice stocks, the most significant impact on rice distribution stems from this new loophole, which enables direct state intervention in the rice market. Furthermore, the 2025 policy change regarding the management of government-held rice stocks is not a temporary measure. Unless reviewed, it will continue even after the “Reiwa Rice Riots” subsides. In this respect, the “Reiwa Rice Riots” represent a historic turning point in rice distribution, comparable to the “Taisho Rice Riots” and the “Heisei Rice Riots.”
PROBLEMS WITH JAPANESE MASS MEDIA REPORTING ON THE “REIWA RICE RIOTS”
This paper’s conclusion describes the reality of the “Reiwa Rice Riots” as experienced by the author through media interactions. Setting aside common occurrences in media engagements—such as “an hour-long interview resulting in only one comment being broadcast or published”—the following features and structures can summarize the unique characteristics of the “Reiwa Rice Riots.”
First, among individuals appearing in the mass media as experts, some were not particularly specialized in their fields, providing erroneous explanations about current policies at a basic level, not at the level of academic theory. Moreover, farmers with limited experience in agricultural management also appeared, while even among the experts, some commentators merely reiterated their long-held personal opinions.
The following factors contribute to this trend: ① Because rice is a familiar food for Japanese people, it is easy for individuals to speak about the “Reiwa Rice Riots” based on their personal feelings, experiences, and observations; and ② Since the price becomes unstable with a supply–demand change equivalent to just one teaspoon per person per day, it is possible to interpret events by stretching connections in various ways.
Particularly for live television and radio broadcasts, live appearances are a fundamental requirement, and studio appearances are often a prerequisite as well. The author has often declined appearances due to scheduling conflicts. Moreover, interview requests are often received with the caveat, “If you cannot appear live in the studio, we will interview someone else.”
Of course, highly specialized individuals do appear in mass media. Notably, the selection criteria for experts featured in mass media, particularly on live television and radio, often prioritize schedule availability over expertise.
This characteristic reveals that in the mass media’s portrayal of the “Reality of the Reiwa Rice Riots,” not every individual who appears is highly specialized. Some farmers and researchers may view an appearance as an opportunity to express their personal opinions using the “Reiwa Rice Riots” as a platform. This situation differs significantly between those responding to media requests during peak busy periods—such as rice farmers interviewed during harvest season or scholars contacted when their primary work is demanding—and those who can engage when their primary responsibilities allow. Furthermore, the tendency for individuals to seek media exposure for promotional purposes, aiming to publicize their businesses, further emphasizes the idea that not every individual who appears on mass media is highly specialized.
Second, due to the mass media’s inherent focus on providing new information, recent topics tend to take priority over future predictions.
The author personally experienced this while covering the “Reiwa Rice Riots.”
In autumn 2024, the author discussed the possibility of a sharp price surge starting late 2024 and its underlying reasons; however, this topic was not covered because the current high prices of new rice were deemed more pressing at the time. Later, when prices surged starting in late 2024, the same reporter contacted the author for an interview, asking about the reasons.
In May 2025, the author discussed the possibility of high prices for the 2025 rice crop and the reasons behind it; however, it was not covered because the immediate price-lowering effect from the government’s rice stockpile was deemed more important. Subsequently, when the price of the 2025 new rice crop rose, the same reporter contacted the author for an interview to inquire about the reasons.
Similar situations occurred frequently. In other words, even when experts could reasonably predict future trends, the mass media did not necessarily cover them. Instead, cases often occurred where somewhat anticipated events were sensationalized as if they had occurred suddenly, presented in a way designed to attract attention. The confusion caused by the “Reiwa Rice Riots” was amplified, to no small extent, by the mass media.
Furthermore, rice in Japan is not merely a foodstuff or crop—it is a vital agricultural product that significantly impacts the entire agricultural sector and food industry. Therefore, a comprehensive explanation of the “Reiwa Rice Riots” is necessary; however, the mass media’s focus has centered on the current and projected future retail prices of rice at supermarkets. To elevate national discourse on Japan’s rice and agriculture, the mass media’s reporting—which currently focuses only on localized topics—must change.
Moreover, a defining feature of the “Reiwa Rice Crisis” was Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Minister Koizumi, who proactively disseminated information to the media and made a rapid succession of new announcements starting in May 2025. Minister Koizumi even posted official statistical results on his own social media before their formal release. At that time, he referenced U.S. President Trump, stating, “Look at President Trump. President Trump, doesn’t he release everything himself?” (Toyo Keizai Online, 2025). This statement appears to reference how President Trump rapidly shared details of trade deals with various countries regarding tariffs on his own social media to attract attention. Moreover, the mass media seemed to be at the mercy of the rapid-fire information that Minister Koizumi released regarding rice.
Indeed, in this author’s assessment, Minister Koizumi’s statements often lack accuracy or exaggerate minor points into major ones; however, some reporting has included his remarks verbatim.
There have been instances where the mass media requested fact-checking from the author, and some statements were deemed inaccurate or misleadingly exaggerated; however, in such cases, the topic itself often remains unreported. As a result, even if journalists identify specific points in the Minister’s statements that are inaccurate or exaggerated, this information rarely reaches the public.
Currently, in Japan, confidence in national rice statistics is wavering, and the credibility of information sources for understanding the reality of the “Reiwa Rice Riots” is being questioned. Furthermore, the development of social media has created a society where everyone can easily disseminate information, a society where “everyone is a media outlet.” Amidst this, both society and individuals must process information calmly.
Food-related anxieties tend to capture public attention and are easily sensationalized. Much work remains to clarify the reality of the “Reiwa Rice Riots.” A calm, shared understanding must be fostered among the entire population, and elucidating the impact that the “Reality of the Reiwa Rice Riots” portrayed by various media outlets has had on distribution is crucial.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This paper is an edited English translation of a portion of OGAWA, M. (2025) “The Reality of Reiwa’s Rice Supply,” in Japan Technical Institute of Food Distribution (ed.), Agricultural Product Distribution Technology 2025, Institute of Food Distribution, Ibaraki, with permission. This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 22K14963.
REFERENCES
OGAWA, M. 2024. A Study on the Phenomenon so-called “Rice Riots in Reiwa Era” : Causes and Lessons of the Rice Shortage the Summer 2024 Japan’s Rice Problem. Nogyokenkyu. 37. 395-418. Available from: http://www.nohken.or.jp/NOGYOKENKUYU/No.37-2024/2024-14_ogawa.pdf.
OGAWA, M. 2025a. Problems with the Release of Stockpiled Rice by Shinjiro Koizumi, Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. Intelligence Nippon. Available from: https://www.intelligence-nippon.jp/2025/07/10/5877/.
OGAWA, M. 2025b. Japan’s Rice Problem. CABI
Tokyo Keizai Online. 2025. Agriculture Minister Koizumi Prematurely Released Preliminary Figures on X, Justifying It by Saying, “President Trump is Releasing Everything Himself.” Intelligence Nippon. Available from: https://toyokeizai.net/articles/-/893170.
[1] The exchange rate for Japanese yen to US dollars has experienced large fluctuations in recent years. To avoid confusion, this paper uniformly applies the monthly average exchange rate as of October 2025 (USD = 151.32 JPY) to calculate the prices of US dollars equivalent.
Characteristics of the Japan Rice Shortage as “Reiwa Rice Riots”
ABSTRACT
The “Reiwa Rice Riots” in Japan exhibit three key characteristics: rice shortages, soaring prices, and historical significance. Triggered by sudden shifts in supply and demand for rice produced in 2023, shortages and fierce competition for rice emerged, causing prices to skyrocket. This event is not merely a temporary trend and is expected to mark a historic turning point in Japan’s rice distribution policy. Furthermore, domestic mass media coverage has become heated, focusing primarily on current and projected supermarket rice prices; however, this reporting often exhibits a narrow perspective or prioritizes sensationalism. Consequently, confusion surrounding the “Reiwa Rice Riots” has been amplified by mass media reporting. To elevate national discourse on Japanese rice and agriculture, the content of mass media coverage—which frequently focuses solely on localized topics—needs to be revised.
Keywords: Reiwa Rice Riots, rice riots, rice shortages, soaring prices, mass media
Three Characteristics of the “Reiwa Rice Riots”
Japanese mass media use the phrase “Reiwa Rice Riots” in the summer of 2024 to capture attention during a rice shortage—Reiwa is the Japanese era name (Reiwa era: May 2019–present). Moreover, due to factors like the sharp rise in rice prices and the release of reserve rice stocks, by August 2025, the mass media sometimes referred to the specific rice shortage of summer 2024 as the “Reiwa Rice Riots,” also applying the term to the broader price surge and associated developments spanning 2024 to 2025.
The term “Reiwa Rice Riots” currently encompasses at least three distinct realities: rice shortages, price surges, and historical significance. This paper analyzes the “Reiwa Rice Riots” by dividing these realities into three categories. Additionally, the author, a scholar who experienced and witnessed media interactions firsthand, shares some of those experiences to supplement the analysis and explore another facet of the “Reiwa Rice Riots.”
The “Reiwa Rice Riots” as a rice shortage
In August 2024, the phrase “Reiwa Rice Riots” experienced a sharp increase in search volume on Google and other platforms (Ogawa 2024). At the time, the mass media reported images of rice disappearing from supermarket shelves in some cities, while some media outlets used the phrase “Reiwa Rice Riots,” which gained widespread use over time.
A notable feature of this incident was insufficient data on actual scarcity. The only exception was Osaka Governor Hirofumi Yoshimura’s investigation into shortages within Osaka Prefecture, which he cited on August 26 as justification for requesting the release of government rice reserves. The specific distribution of the rice shortages remained unclear; however, as information spread through news reports and social media, the situation quickly spread to other cities and rural areas, leading to nationwide rice shortages.
A combination of supply and demand issues was the main factor behind the rice shortages in the summer of 2024.
On the supply side, the intense heatwave of 2023 caused high-temperature damage to rice crops, resulting in a nationwide decline in rice quality. Rice varieties with relatively low heat tolerance (including Koshihikari, which holds the top share in both domestic production and consumption) suffered significant quality deterioration. The ratio of Grade 1 rice for Niigata Prefecture’s Koshihikari fell to 4.9% (compared to the average of 75.3%). The 2023 rice crop was also characterized by a significant decrease in the amount of rice falling through the sieve during sorting (known as sieve-bottom rice), falling from 510,000 tons to 320,000 tons.
On the demand side, consumption exceeded the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries’ projections, driven primarily by soaring prices. Beyond the general upward trend in prices, the Ukraine crisis increased prices for bread and noodles, which use wheat as a raw material. Conversely, rice prices were stable among foodstuffs. For citizens struggling with inflation, rice seemed relatively affordable, making it easier for demand to grow. Furthermore, after May 8, 2023, COVID-19 was reclassified as a Category 5 infectious disease under Japan’s Infectious Diseases Control Law. Following this, the restaurant industry began to recover, and the momentum for recovery and an increase in foreign tourists gained momentum. This situation led to a significant surge in rice demand, encompassing both restaurant consumption and inbound tourism.
Furthermore, during the transitional period in August 2024, a special advisory was issued for the Nankai Trough earthquake, while the erratic path of a large typhoon (Typhoon No. 10) heightened food stockpiling awareness across much of the country.
Additionally, high-temperature damage to rice crops and increased damage from stink bugs, whose annual occurrence frequency rose due to higher temperatures, reduced the proportion of rice suitable for commercial distribution.
Industry stakeholders anticipated the 2023 rice harvest scarcity, with competition for rice already expected to begin by autumn of that year; thus, the “Reiwa Rice Riots” were not merely a shortage caused by insufficient supply, but a phenomenon driven by fierce competition for rice.
The “Reiwa Rice Riots” as a price surge
Rice prices began rising in June 2024 before surging sharply due to “multiple factors.” For example, beyond price increases due to the scarcity of the 2023 rice crop, competition for the 2024 crop intensified. Wholesalers, restaurants, and catering services competed for supplies, leading to diversified procurement channels. Moreover, consumers purchased rice directly from farmers or secured it through hometown tax donations, further fueling the scramble for the commodity. The increased procurement costs were passed on to consumers through higher retail prices, leaving no choice but to accept the increases.
The price increases from the 2023 rice crop through the 2025 crop occurred in five distinct periods or stages.
The first stage occurred from March to June 2024. Prices did not rise significantly from autumn 2023 through February 2024, while the scramble for rice began. However, starting in March 2024, rice traders began to feel that supply and demand would tighten. At this time, the transaction price between shippers and wholesalers rose 2.8% from JPY15,428 (US$102[1]) per 60kg (March) to JPY15,865 (US$105) (June), reaching its highest level in about 11 years.
The second surge occurred from July to August 2024. On July 30, 2024, the government announced that rice demand from July 2023 to June 2024 had grown significantly more than forecasted. Furthermore, heightened vigilance against earthquakes and typhoons in August increased household stockpiling. The transaction price between shippers and wholesalers reached JPY16,133 (US$107) per 60kg in August 2024, the highest August price recorded since statistics began in 2008.
According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications’ “Retail Price Statistics,” the retail price per 5kg of Koshihikari rice in Tokyo’s 23 wards had remained below JPY2,500 (US$17) since 2011; however, it rose to JPY2,561 (US$17) in June 2024 (a 12.2% year-over-year increase) and further to JPY2,871 (US$19) in August 2024 (a 23.1% year-over-year increase). The price increase during this period is believed to have been driven by panic buying, resulting from the absence of established routine stockpiling behavior. Furthermore, the timing of this behavior, which occurred during the transitional period before new rice became widely available, significantly exacerbated the rice shortage.
The third wave occurred from September 2024 to October 2024. Even after new rice became widely available, prices did not decline due to intensified competition for rice and lower-than-expected rice quality. Increased demand for the 2023 crop led to “early consumption of new rice” for the 2024 crop, which sustained tight supply and demand conditions.
The fourth wave occurred from November 2024 to February 2025. Following the rice shortage in summer 2024, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) announced its detailed analysis results at the end of October. However, rather than presenting detailed findings, the summary essentially stated that the dissemination of appropriate information was a key issue and that MAFF would strengthen its efforts to release information.
This statement reaffirmed MAFF’s stance of merely issuing information without taking direct action, even when the private sector faced turmoil. This situation led to heightened crisis awareness among businesses and a surge in transaction prices between them.
Notably, during this season, buyers began offering prices significantly higher than the provisional payments that agricultural cooperatives (JAs) typically present to rice farmers during collection. Consequently, major collectors, such as JA groups, failed to secure sufficient rice, resulting in a 230,000-ton decrease in collection volume and a 480,000-ton drop in inventory by the end of January 2025 compared to the same period the previous year. Meanwhile, major wholesalers successfully maintained inventory levels comparable to those of previous years. The risk of purchasing at high prices was mitigated by passing on the costs to the consumer. Backed by purchasing support from actual consumers, major rice wholesalers achieved record profits and rising stock prices.
The government’s decision to release reserve rice in February 2025 temporarily suppressed rice prices. However, the 2023 crop was already trading at high prices during collection and distribution. Even with the release of reserve rice, prices for the 2023 crop did not decline significantly.
The fifth wave is the price of the 2025 crop, as the scramble for rice continues, and prices remain unsettled. JAs in regions where the collection rate for the 2024 crop declined are attempting to compensate by increasing the estimated payments offered to rice farmers for the 2025 crop. Some JAs have even introduced a new approach: presenting an estimated payment as a minimum guaranteed amount before sowing, regardless of price fluctuations.
The author anticipates that the same situation of intense competition for rice among diverse entities, observed with the 2024 crop, will recur in 2025.
The “Reiwa Rice Riots” as a historical event
Japan’s rice production has faced ongoing adjustments amid long-term declining demand, resulting in a persistent downward trend in prices (Ogawa 2025b). Against this backdrop, the “Reiwa Rice Riots,” characterized by rice shortages and price surges, represent an unprecedented shift in the balance of supply and demand.
Can the “Reiwa Rice Riots” be evaluated as a historical event on par with the historically recognized “Taisho Rice Riots” and “Heisei Rice Riots”?
Regarding this point, Ogawa (2024b) noted that the evaluation criterion should be whether there was a significant policy change that affected the fundamental principle of the current policy, which is that the private sector primarily leads rice distribution. Both the “Taisho Rice Riots” and the “Heisei Rice Riots” served as catalysts for shifts concerning state intervention in rice distribution. Taisho is a Japanese era name (Taisho era: July 1912 to December 1926). Heisei is a Japanese era name (Heisei era: January 1989 to April 2019). The “Taisho Rice Riots” catalyzed the shift from an era of essentially free rice trading to one of state intervention. Similarly, the “Heisei Rice Riots” became a catalyst for advancing: ① the opening of the rice market, ② private-sector-led rice distribution, and ③ the legalization of government rice stockpiles.
Based on this criterion, merely observing the actual conditions of shortages and price surges cannot position the “Reiwa Rice Riots” as a historically significant event.
From a historical perspective, the key point of the “Reiwa Rice Riots” is the policy change implemented in January 2025, which enabled the release of government-held rice reserves to facilitate smoother distribution. This change led to the release of large quantities of government-held rice reserves by August 2025, resulting in significant state intervention and influence on rice distribution and supply–demand dynamics. Based on the criteria outlined by Ogawa (2024b), it can be argued that the situation qualifying as the “Reiwa Rice Riots” was established with the 2025 policy change.
From the perspective of rice distribution, the key points of the 2025 policy change are as follows.
First, on January 31, under Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Taku Eto, the operational policy for government-held reserve rice was revised. The revised policy now allows the release of reserve rice “when obstacles arise in the smooth distribution of rice for primary consumption, and the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries deems it necessary, within the scope that does not hinder the smooth operation of the reserves.” To implement this policy change without amending the Food Law, the release was structured as a “sale with repurchase conditions,” functioning as a loan of government reserve rice. While the national policy maintains that private sector distribution is fundamental, this change created a mechanism allowing direct government intervention in rice distribution based on the Minister’s judgment. Actual auctions commenced in February.
The policy change that accelerated state intervention in distribution was the abolition of the “sale with repurchase conditions” mechanism itself, carried out under the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, Shinjiro Koizumi. This policy change was implemented without consulting the Food, Agriculture, and Rural Policy Council, as stipulated by Article 4 of the Food Act, and was subsequently abolished by Minister Koizumi’s unilateral decision (Ogawa 2025a). Previously, releasing government-held rice stocks required Cabinet approval during emergencies and deliberation by the Food, Agriculture, and Rural Policy Council during shortages. However, in 2025, Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Eto enabled the release of government-held rice stockpiles through “sale with repurchase conditions.” Minister Koizumi’s abolition of this “sale with repurchase conditions” created a new loophole in policy tools, allowing the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries to release any amount of government-held rice stockpiles at their discretion.
While attention tended to focus on the method (discretionary contracts), sales destinations, and sales volume of Minister Koizumi’s releases of government-held rice stocks, the most significant impact on rice distribution stems from this new loophole, which enables direct state intervention in the rice market. Furthermore, the 2025 policy change regarding the management of government-held rice stocks is not a temporary measure. Unless reviewed, it will continue even after the “Reiwa Rice Riots” subsides. In this respect, the “Reiwa Rice Riots” represent a historic turning point in rice distribution, comparable to the “Taisho Rice Riots” and the “Heisei Rice Riots.”
PROBLEMS WITH JAPANESE MASS MEDIA REPORTING ON THE “REIWA RICE RIOTS”
This paper’s conclusion describes the reality of the “Reiwa Rice Riots” as experienced by the author through media interactions. Setting aside common occurrences in media engagements—such as “an hour-long interview resulting in only one comment being broadcast or published”—the following features and structures can summarize the unique characteristics of the “Reiwa Rice Riots.”
First, among individuals appearing in the mass media as experts, some were not particularly specialized in their fields, providing erroneous explanations about current policies at a basic level, not at the level of academic theory. Moreover, farmers with limited experience in agricultural management also appeared, while even among the experts, some commentators merely reiterated their long-held personal opinions.
The following factors contribute to this trend: ① Because rice is a familiar food for Japanese people, it is easy for individuals to speak about the “Reiwa Rice Riots” based on their personal feelings, experiences, and observations; and ② Since the price becomes unstable with a supply–demand change equivalent to just one teaspoon per person per day, it is possible to interpret events by stretching connections in various ways.
Particularly for live television and radio broadcasts, live appearances are a fundamental requirement, and studio appearances are often a prerequisite as well. The author has often declined appearances due to scheduling conflicts. Moreover, interview requests are often received with the caveat, “If you cannot appear live in the studio, we will interview someone else.”
Of course, highly specialized individuals do appear in mass media. Notably, the selection criteria for experts featured in mass media, particularly on live television and radio, often prioritize schedule availability over expertise.
This characteristic reveals that in the mass media’s portrayal of the “Reality of the Reiwa Rice Riots,” not every individual who appears is highly specialized. Some farmers and researchers may view an appearance as an opportunity to express their personal opinions using the “Reiwa Rice Riots” as a platform. This situation differs significantly between those responding to media requests during peak busy periods—such as rice farmers interviewed during harvest season or scholars contacted when their primary work is demanding—and those who can engage when their primary responsibilities allow. Furthermore, the tendency for individuals to seek media exposure for promotional purposes, aiming to publicize their businesses, further emphasizes the idea that not every individual who appears on mass media is highly specialized.
Second, due to the mass media’s inherent focus on providing new information, recent topics tend to take priority over future predictions.
The author personally experienced this while covering the “Reiwa Rice Riots.”
In autumn 2024, the author discussed the possibility of a sharp price surge starting late 2024 and its underlying reasons; however, this topic was not covered because the current high prices of new rice were deemed more pressing at the time. Later, when prices surged starting in late 2024, the same reporter contacted the author for an interview, asking about the reasons.
In May 2025, the author discussed the possibility of high prices for the 2025 rice crop and the reasons behind it; however, it was not covered because the immediate price-lowering effect from the government’s rice stockpile was deemed more important. Subsequently, when the price of the 2025 new rice crop rose, the same reporter contacted the author for an interview to inquire about the reasons.
Similar situations occurred frequently. In other words, even when experts could reasonably predict future trends, the mass media did not necessarily cover them. Instead, cases often occurred where somewhat anticipated events were sensationalized as if they had occurred suddenly, presented in a way designed to attract attention. The confusion caused by the “Reiwa Rice Riots” was amplified, to no small extent, by the mass media.
Furthermore, rice in Japan is not merely a foodstuff or crop—it is a vital agricultural product that significantly impacts the entire agricultural sector and food industry. Therefore, a comprehensive explanation of the “Reiwa Rice Riots” is necessary; however, the mass media’s focus has centered on the current and projected future retail prices of rice at supermarkets. To elevate national discourse on Japan’s rice and agriculture, the mass media’s reporting—which currently focuses only on localized topics—must change.
Moreover, a defining feature of the “Reiwa Rice Crisis” was Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Minister Koizumi, who proactively disseminated information to the media and made a rapid succession of new announcements starting in May 2025. Minister Koizumi even posted official statistical results on his own social media before their formal release. At that time, he referenced U.S. President Trump, stating, “Look at President Trump. President Trump, doesn’t he release everything himself?” (Toyo Keizai Online, 2025). This statement appears to reference how President Trump rapidly shared details of trade deals with various countries regarding tariffs on his own social media to attract attention. Moreover, the mass media seemed to be at the mercy of the rapid-fire information that Minister Koizumi released regarding rice.
Indeed, in this author’s assessment, Minister Koizumi’s statements often lack accuracy or exaggerate minor points into major ones; however, some reporting has included his remarks verbatim.
There have been instances where the mass media requested fact-checking from the author, and some statements were deemed inaccurate or misleadingly exaggerated; however, in such cases, the topic itself often remains unreported. As a result, even if journalists identify specific points in the Minister’s statements that are inaccurate or exaggerated, this information rarely reaches the public.
Currently, in Japan, confidence in national rice statistics is wavering, and the credibility of information sources for understanding the reality of the “Reiwa Rice Riots” is being questioned. Furthermore, the development of social media has created a society where everyone can easily disseminate information, a society where “everyone is a media outlet.” Amidst this, both society and individuals must process information calmly.
Food-related anxieties tend to capture public attention and are easily sensationalized. Much work remains to clarify the reality of the “Reiwa Rice Riots.” A calm, shared understanding must be fostered among the entire population, and elucidating the impact that the “Reality of the Reiwa Rice Riots” portrayed by various media outlets has had on distribution is crucial.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This paper is an edited English translation of a portion of OGAWA, M. (2025) “The Reality of Reiwa’s Rice Supply,” in Japan Technical Institute of Food Distribution (ed.), Agricultural Product Distribution Technology 2025, Institute of Food Distribution, Ibaraki, with permission. This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 22K14963.
REFERENCES
OGAWA, M. 2024. A Study on the Phenomenon so-called “Rice Riots in Reiwa Era” : Causes and Lessons of the Rice Shortage the Summer 2024 Japan’s Rice Problem. Nogyokenkyu. 37. 395-418. Available from: http://www.nohken.or.jp/NOGYOKENKUYU/No.37-2024/2024-14_ogawa.pdf.
OGAWA, M. 2025a. Problems with the Release of Stockpiled Rice by Shinjiro Koizumi, Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. Intelligence Nippon. Available from: https://www.intelligence-nippon.jp/2025/07/10/5877/.
OGAWA, M. 2025b. Japan’s Rice Problem. CABI
Tokyo Keizai Online. 2025. Agriculture Minister Koizumi Prematurely Released Preliminary Figures on X, Justifying It by Saying, “President Trump is Releasing Everything Himself.” Intelligence Nippon. Available from: https://toyokeizai.net/articles/-/893170.
[1] The exchange rate for Japanese yen to US dollars has experienced large fluctuations in recent years. To avoid confusion, this paper uniformly applies the monthly average exchange rate as of October 2025 (USD = 151.32 JPY) to calculate the prices of US dollars equivalent.